From Policy Rate to Market Rates: An Empirical Analysis of Finnish Monetary Transmission by Redward, Peter & Saarenheimo, Tuomas
Suomen Pankki 
Bank of Finland 
P.O.Box 160, SF-00101 HELSINKI, Finland 
=  + 358 0 1831 BANK OF FINLAND DISCUSSION PAPERS  22/96 
Peter Redward -  Tuomas Saarenheirno 
Economics Department 
26.9.1996 
From Policy Rate to Market Rates: 
An Empirical Analysis of 
Finnish Monetary Transmission ISBN 95 1-686-5  18-6 
ISSN 0785-3572 
Suomen Pankin monistuskeskus 
Helsinki 1996 From Policy Rate to Market Rates: 
An Empirical Analysis of Finnish Monetary Transmission 
Bank of Finland Discussion Papers 22/96 
Peter Redward -  Tuomas Saarenheirno 
Economics Department 
Abstract 
In this paper we analyse the empirical relevance of the mechanisms through which 
the  Bank  of  Finland's  actions  are  transmitted  to  the  Finnish  economy.  We 
concentrate on  the first stage of  the monetary policy  transmission  mechanism; 
namely, the effect of the Bank's actions on domestic market interest rates and the 
exchange rate. The questions we analyse include: What is the impact of a change in 
the Bank of Finland's one month tender rate on interest rates of longer maturities and 
on the exchange rate? How do Finnish interest rates and the exchange rate react to 
turmoil in foreign money and bond markets? To what extent can recent developments 
in Finnish interest rates be attributed to the Bank of Finland's policies? 
We find that the effect of a monetary policy shock is limited to the short end of 
the yield curve. Changes in the Bank of  Finland's tender rate seem to signal the 
future path of short rates for a period of  1-2  years. On the other hand, Finnish bond 
rates appear to follow closely circumstances in the international financial market and 
do not seem to react systematically to changes in the Bank of Finland's tender rate. 
We find that monetary policy has contributed little to the large swings in Finnish 
bond rates experienced over the last few years. Most of the variation in bond rates 
can be attributed to changes in international long rates and changes in the perceived 
overall credibility of the Finnish economy. 
Key words: monetary policy transmission, VAR-models, Finland Tiivistelma 
Tutkimuksessa  analysoidaan  empiirisesti  Suomen  Pankin  huutokauppakoron 
muutosten vdittymista Suomen talouteen. Tyossa keskitytaan vaIittymismekanismin 
ensimmaiseen  vaiheeseen,  eli  Suomen  Pankin  toimien  vaikutukseen  markkina- 
korkoihin ja markan valuuttakurssiin. Tutkimuksessa haetaan vastausta muun muassa 
seuraaviin kysymyksiin: Miten muutokset Suomen Pankin huutokauppakorossa vdit- 
tyvat pitemman maturiteetin korkoihin? Miten Suomen markkinakorot ja valuutta- 
kurssi reagoivat ulkomaisten korkojen muutoksiin? Milta osin markkinakorkojen 
viime vuosien kehitys on seurausta Suomen Pankin toimista? 
Tutkimuksen mukaan  Suomen Pankin operaatioiden  vaikutukset rajoittuvat 
korkokayran lyhyeen paiihan. Muutokset huutokauppakorossa nayttavat valittavan 
informaatiota  tulevien  lyhyiden  korkojen  tasosta  noin  12 vuoden  tiihtaimella. 
Toisaalta Suomen pitkat korot nayttavat seuraavan laeisesti tapahtumia kansain- 
valisilla rahoitusmarkkinoilla,  eivatka reagoi  systemaattisesti muutoksiin  huuto- 
kauppakorossa. Tulosten mukaan rahapolitiikan valiton merkitys pitkien korkojen 
viime vuosien jyrkissa vaihteluissa on ollut viihainen. Vaihtelut ovat ollet seurausta 
pWiassa  muutoksista kansainviilisissa pitkissa koroissa seka Suomen talouden tilaa 
kohtaan tunnetussa luottamuksessa. 
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References 1  Introduction 
The mandate of the Bank of Finland is to safeguard the value of the Finnish markka. 
To fulfill this mandate, the Bank of Finland, as with all central banks in countries 
with liberal financial markets, is armed with an  array of  imprecise instruments. 
Under the current regime, the Bank of Finland only has control over very short-term 
interest rates. As one moves towards bonds with longer maturities, the influence of 
the Bank of Finland diminishes. Long-term yields and the floating exchange rate of 
the markka are determined by the market's expectations of the future performance of 
the economy and the future economic policies, both in Finland and abroad. 
In  this paper we  try to shed some light on  the empirical relevance of  the 
mechanisms through which the Bank of Finland's actions are transmitted within the 
Finnish  economy.  We  concentrate  on  the  first  stage  of  the  monetary  policy 
transmission mechanism; namely,  the effect of  the Bank's  actions on  domestic 
market interest rates and the exchange rate. The questions we analyze include the 
following: What is the impact of a change in the Bank of Finland's one month tender 
rate on interest rates of longer maturities and on the exchange rate? How do Finnish 
interest rates and the exchange rate react to turmoil in foreign money and bond 
markets? To what extent can the recent developments in Finnish interest rates be 
attributed to the Bank of Finland's policies? 
The analytical tool we employ is a variant of  the popular structural vector 
autoregression  (VAR),  or  more  precisely  a  structural  vector-error-correction 
approach. Ideally, the analysis of the transmission mechanism of  monetary policy 
would  be  conducted  within  the  framework  of  a  fully  specified  dynamic 
macroeconomic  model  capable  of  producing  plausible  policy  simulations  and 
forecasts. However, policy actions are transmitted to the financial markets through 
various mechanisms, many of which depend heavily on expectations. The structural 
macroeconomic description of these mechanisms would be highly complicated and, 
in the fully structural form, possibly not identifiable. 
Our analysis indicates that monetary policy shocks, defined as innovations to the 
Bank of Finland's tender rate, have a statistically significant effect only at the short 
end of  the yield curve. Bond rates and the exchange rate do not seem to react 
systematically to changes in policy rates; rather they seem to be affected mainly by 
international bond rates and the overall credibility of Finnish economic policy. 
When interpreting the results, two remarks should be kept in mind. First, the 
model analyzes the effects of monetary policy shocks, it does not deal with the effects 
of monetary policy strategies. That is, the model takes the monetary policy regime as 
given and assumes that monetary policy actions are not interpreted as changes in the 
regime. Second, the model is constructed for analyzing monetary policy effects, not 
for forecasting purposes. This is reflected in various choices concerning the modeling 
strategy. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section two reviews the literature on the 
analysis of monetary policy transmission using VAR models. We specifically focus 
on the identification of monetary policy shocks. In section three we construct an 
econometric model which we use to address questions concerning the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism in Finland. In section four we analyze the effects of 
domestic monetary policy shocks and foreign shocks on the Finnish yield curve and 
exchange rate. Section five concludes the paper. 2  Monetary policy transmission using Vector 
Autoregression (VAR) methods 
2.1  Measuring shocks to monetary policy 
Central to an analysis of the effects of monetary policy changes is the identification 
of monetary policy shocks. The ideal measure of monetary policy would be one that 
is under the direct control of the central bank, evolves according to the decisions of 
policy makers, and is, in the short-run, unaffected by  changes in the demand for 
money.  Generally, two  classes  of  candidates  for  such  a  measure  have  been 
considered in the literature (mainly on US data). 
1.  Innovations in a measure of liquidity targeted by the central bank. 
2.  Innovations in an interest rate predetermined by the central bank. 
The  choice  between  these  candidates  depends  on  the  strategy  and  operating 
procedures of the central bank. 
The first approach is appropriate if the central bank's policy is best described as 
some variant of  the monetarist  approach. In  other words, if  the central bank's 
operating target is some measure of  liquidity and its open market operations are 
aimed at keeping this measure at the level set by the bank (thus allowing the interest 
rate to adjust to balance supply and demand), then monetary policy shocks are best 
measured by innovations to that particular measure of liquidity. Often the choice of 
the correct measure of liquidity is not obvious. In the case of the US Federal Reserve, 
several alternatives have been used. Eichenbaum (1992) used innovations in total 
reserves to characterise changes in the stance of monetary policy in the United States. 
In  another approach that has gained some popularity, Strongin (1992) measured 
monetary policy by changes in non-borrowed reserves relative to total reserves. 
Another branch of  work has focused on  short-term interest rates to identify 
monetary policy shocks (Sims 1992, Bernanke and Blinder 1992, and Bernanke and 
Mihov 1995). Bernanke and Blinder chose the Federal Funds rate as an appropriate 
measure of monetary policy arguing that while it is not the marginal interest rate for 
the banking system, it is the rate that the Federal Reserve holds as predetermined  . 
over their frequency of interest (one month). They point out that although the Federal 
Funds rate is not strictly exogenous, it should be exogenous in the short-run so that 
its innovations can be interpreted as monetary policy shocks. 
2.2  Empirical identification of Finnish monetary policy 
shocks 
Our estimation period starts at the announcement of inflation target by the Bank of 
Finland. During that period, the Bank has used short interest rates as its operative 
target. Interventions in the currency market have been infrequent and targeted to 
reduce short term fluctuations. In that sense, the monetary policy regime has been 
stable during the estimation period. 
However, in  December  1994, the Bank  of  Finland changed its  operating procedure in open market operations. Up to that point, open market operations had 
been managed, to keep l-month and 3-month HELIBOR rates inside corridors set by 
the board of  the Bank  of  Finland. The boundaries  of  these corridors were not 
communicated to the general public. During that period, changes in short rates 
usually took place gradually rather than in discreet steps, and it was difficult for the 
market to separate within-band rate movements from shifts in the corridor. 
Since December 1994, the Bank of Finland has set only the l-month tender rate. 
The Bank operates solely at this maturity and market operations are conducted on a 
fixed-rate basis to keep the tender rate at the level set by the board. The tender rate is 
changed infrequently, and always after an explicit decision by the board. The typical 
change is  25  or 50 basis points.  The goals of  the new  procedure were greater 
transparency in Bank policy and clearer signalling of monetary policy. 
Such a recent change in  the  operating procedure creates problems  for the 
empirical measurement of monetary policy. Under the current operating procedure, 
the choice of the measure is rather straightforward. The present method of monetary 
policy formulation of the Bank resembles closely that of the US Federal Reserve. 
Since monetary policy actions are executed directly through changes in the l-month 
tender rate,  innovations to  that  rate  should provide  an  acceptable  measure of 
monetary policy shocks. However, during 1993 and most of  1994, when monetary 
policy  was  executed through  market  operations in  both  l-month  and  3-month 
maturities, the situation was different. The nature of the change is clearly observable 
in Figure 1. Up to December 1994, the 1  -month tender rate fluctuates in small steps 
in a rather continuous manner, while in the latter part of the period (up to week 22 of 
1996), the tender rate changes only 8 times. 
We  decided to follow the approach of  Bernanke and Blinder and chose to 
measure Finnish monetary policy shocks by innovations to the l-month tender rate. 
There is really no better choice available: monetary aggregates play a secondary role 
in the setting of Finnish monetary policy, and fluctuations of monetary aggregates 
mainly reflect changes in money demand. We expected the structural break to cause 
problems mainly in the estimated relationship between the l-month and the 3-month 
rates, and anticipated our results would suffer from two kinds of bias. First, during 
the earlier part of the estimation period the Bank of Finland intervened actively in the 
3-month maturity, so monetary shocks may not be fully captured by innovations to 
the l-month rate. Second, that part of the (within-band) variation in the l-month rate 
during the first part of the estimation period which was caused by market situations, 
will be erroneously interpreted as monetary policy shocks. Nevertheless we did not 
expect this problem to cause major trouble in measuring the transmission of policy 
shocks from the short end of the yield curve to the long end. We return to these 
expectations later in section 4 where we test for a structural break in the model. 
Finally, changes in the tender rate in the latter part of the estimation period have 
not  been  normally  distributed.  Instead,  the  distribution  resembles  a  discrete 
distribution with most of the probability mass on zero and discrete probabilities on 
round number such as 25 basis points, 50 basis points, etc. Then, a normal VAR 
model is not the optimal tool for analysing such a phenomenon. In principle, one 
could think about a system including both some variation of a probit model for the 
probability of a change in the tender rate and another model for the expected size of 
the  change. Implementing  such  a  model  in  a  dynamic multivariate  system is, 
however, not an realistic option. 3  Model and estimation 
3.1  The data 
Figure 1.  Endogenous variables 
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The data used in this analysis is the Friday mid-point values for the period starting in 
1993:5 and extending to 1996:22, giving a total of  174 weekly observations. The 
beginning of the period coincides with the announcement of the inflation target by 
the Bank of Finland. The model has five endogenous variables. The interest rate used 
as a measure of monetary policy is the one month tender rate (Flm), set by the Bank 
of  Finland. Short-term Finnish interest rates include the three month (F3m) and 
twelve month (F12m) HELIBOR interest rates. The bond rate (Fbr) is the yield of the 
Finnish Government benchmark bond with maturity date in March 2004. This series 
only extends back to mid-1993, so for the first half of  1993 we chain link the series 
backwards using the Finnish Government housing fund's benchmark bond maturing 
in March 2002. The fifth endogenous variable is the log of the Finnish trade weighted 
exchange rate (Fer). The endogenous variables are plotted in Figure 1. 
The  exogenous  variables  include  a  variety  of  indicators of  international 
monetary  conditions.  We  use  German  interest  rates  as  the  measure  of  the 
international level of interest rates, including foreign short rates such as the German 
three-month (D3m) and twelve-month (D12m) euromarket rates, and the German 
bond rate (Dbr), calculated from the German Government bond maturing in July 
2002. 
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............... We  also included several Swedish interest rates in the model. This choice 
reflects not so much the intrinsic importance of the Swedish financial market to the 
local market. Rather, the changes in Swedish rates complement German rates as an 
indicator of the amount of general uncertainty in the European financial market as a 
whole.  A  rise in  Swedish rates relative to German rates may  reflect  a rise  in 
uncertainty in the international financial markets which, in turn, generates a "flight- 
to-quality";  a flow of money out of high-yield fringe countries such as Sweden to 
low-yield safe havens such as Germany. During the estimation period, Finland has 
been mostly associated with the former group, so we would expect to find similarities 
between the behaviour of Finnish and Swedish bond rates. Of  course, any statistical 
correlations between Finnish rates and Swedish rates is not to be interpreted as 
causality from the latter to the former, but instead as an indication of the similarity 
with which international investors rate the two countries. Thus, we included the 
Swedish three-month  (S3m)  and  twelve-month  (S12m) STlBOR rates  and the 
Swedish 10-year bond rate (Sbr, from Reuters) as exogenous variables. Further, we 
include the log of the Swedish trade-weighted exchange rate (Ser). 
We also included a measure of the default risk on Finnish Government bonds 
(drisk). It is calculated as the difference in yields between the Finnish Government 
deutschmark bond maturing on the 25th of June 2002 with a coupon rate of 8.25 and 
the German Government bond GBR with a coupon rate of 8.0. Finally, we included 
a step dummy (sd95w15) for the week 95: 15, marking the approval of the sizable 
spending reduction program by the newly appointed government. 
3.2  Stationarity and cointegration properties 
Given the high frequency of the data, it is no surprise that conventional unit root tests 
found non-stationarity in practically all of the time series. Hence, we estimated the 
model in an error correction form. Formal tests of  the cointegration relationships 
(such as Johansen's Maximum Likelihood method) are plagued by the large number 
of exogenous variables entering the cointegration space which alter the distributions 
of the test statistics. We arrived at four cointegration relationships each of which is 
judged to be stationary by the conventional tests (see Table 1 for Dickey-Fuller tests), 
performs well in the model estimation, and can be assigned a satisfactory economic 
interpretation. The cointegration relationships are the following: 
ec, = Flm -  F3m 
ec, = F3m -  0.702 Flm -  0.298 F12m 
ec, = F12m -  0.679 F3m -  0.474 Fbr 
ec, = Fbr -  1.03 Sbr -  0.86 (Sbr -  S 12m) + 0.727 (Sbr-S3m) 
-  0.317 Gbr -  0.923 (Gbr-Gl2m) + 0.59 (Gbr43m) 
-  4.69 Ser + 1.38 s95w15 
The  first  cointegrating vector  simply reflects the  stationarity of  the  difference 
between the tender rate and the three-month rate. The second cointegrating vector 
indicates that in the long-run, the three-month rate is a weighted average of the tender 
rate and the twelve-month rate. The third equation presents a similar relationship 
between the three-month rate, the twelve-month rate and the bond rate. This equation 
is, however, not homogenous of degree one. Table 1.  Unit root tests (augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics) 
ec,  (no constant) 
ec,  (constant incl.) 
ec,  (constant incl.) 
ec,  (constant incl.) 
Lags 
1  2  3 
-3.28  -2.59  -2.51 
-7.04  -5.21  -5.39 
-2.98  -3.22  -3.05 
-7.05  -6.27  -5.33 
Approximate critical values without constant term 5% = -1.94,  1  % = -2.58;  with constant term 
5% = -2.88,  1% = -3.47. Test statistics corresponding to the last significant lag are in bold. 
The fourth cointegrating vector is more complicated. Essentially, it relates the 
Finnish bond rate to the German and Swedish bond rates, but allows the shapes of the 
foreign yield curves and the performance of currencies to contribute as well. Both the 
Swedish and German bond rates contribute strongly to the Finnish bond rate in the 
long-run, the Swedish bond rate with close to a unit coefficient. The trade-weighted 
exchange rate of the Swedish krona also enters this relationship. This does not imply 
any direct causality between the two, nor can it be seen as an indication of a lasting 
cointegrating relation. The motive for this choice is to control for the effects of 
international currency turmoils on the endogenous variables to avoid biases in the 
estimated relationships between the endogenous variables. For the period in question, 
the Swedish exchange appeared to react systematically to situations in currency 
markets and was therefore judged to be a satisfactory proxy for such effects1. 
Finally, the cointegration vector assigns a  1.38 percentage point long-term 
reduction in the Finnish bond rate to the deficit reduction package in the spring of 
1995, as captured by the dummy variable. 
3.3  Identifying the structural error correction model 
As discussed in section 2.2, we measure monetary policy shocks by innovations to 
the 1-month tender rate. By doing this, we effectively assume that monetary policy 
does not react to situations in the financial markets within the same period. Any 
contemporaneous correlations between the residual of the equation for the 1-month 
rate and the residuals of other equations are interpreted as contemporaneous causality 
from the policy rate to other variables. Given the high (weekly) frequency of  our 
data, we think this is a fair approximation of reality. 
We  do not seek to identify the contemporaneous structure of  the model any 
further. The part of the residual variation of the four non-policy variables which is 
not accounted for by the monetary policy shock is left unspecified. We do not have 
sufficient theoretical or other information for that end, nor it is the primary purpose 
of this paper which is mainly concerned with the transmission of monetary policy 
shocks. 
'  The results indicate that during the estimation period, currency market situations which weaken the 
Swedish exchange rate tend also to increase the Finnish bond rate. We  make no statement about 
whether such a relation will continue to exist in the future. Since the model is intended for policy 
analysis and not for forecasting purposes, such stability (or the lack thereof) is of little concern. Hence, the estimated model is of the following form: 
Axl,,  = Al  + B1 M,  + Clect-l  + el,, 
 AX^,^ = A,  + Bi 4  + Ciect-l  +  Ei,, + @el,,  t 
for i = 2, ...,  5 
where x = {Flm,  F3m, F12m, Fbr, Fer), E is the corresponding vector of residuals, 
Z is the vector of exogenous variables and ec is the vector of cointegrating vectors. 
The contemporaneous effect of  monetary policy on the non-policy variables is 
captured by the 8 coefficients. 
The estimation results are summarized in Table 2 and look typical for this type 
of regression.  The Bank of  Finland tender rate  seems to be  little predicted by 
anything besides the 3-month money market rate, entering the model in both lagged 
difference form and in the first error-correction term, it seems to be a quite powerful 
predictor  of  changes  in  the  tender  rate.  This  is  well  in  accordance  with  the 
expectations hypothesis; ie, if the market correctly uses all available information, 
then no other variable should have predicting power for the tender rate except the 
term premium at the short end of the yield curve. 
Generally, the error-correction terms explain most variation in the tender rate. 
At the long end of the yield curve, changes in foreign interest rates are also powerful 
predictors. Finally, the exchange rate is affected mainly by the cointegrating vector 
for the bond rate; when there is a downward pressure on the bond rate, the markka 
tends to appreciate. 
Residual cross-correlations generally proved to be high. The residual of  the 
tender rate equation has a correlation coefficient of almost 0.8 with the residual of the 
3-month helibor and nearly 0.5 with the residual of  12-month helibor. Generally, 
residuals for interest rates of  adjacent maturities correlate strongly. Overall, the 
covariance matrix indicates that contemporaneous effects play a large role in the 
system. Table 2 gives the 8 coefficients (with their asymptotic standard errors) for the 
contemporaneous  effects of  monetary policy  shocks, implied by  the covariance 
matrix. 
Model diagnostics are satisfactory except for the normality of  the residuals, 
which is rejected in three of  the five residual series. In each case, non-normality 
arises because  of  fat-tailed distributions. The normality assumption is  severely 
violated by the Bank of Finland's tender rate which tends to move infrequently and 
in  discrete  steps.  Tests  do not  find  any  systematic form  of  heteroscedasticity, 
although the aforementioned non-normality may affect the distribution of the test 
statistics. 
Overall, non-normality of the residuals will have only limited implications for 
the results of this paper. By using OLS, we lose some efficiency, although OLS still 
remains the  BLU  (best linear unbiased) estimator  also in  this  case.  Parameter 
estimates and the standard errors continue to be unbiased. The distribution of the 
parameter estimates is still asymptotically normal, so the use of a normal distribution 
for the parameters when simulating system responses is justified. On the other hand, 
non-normality does have an effect on the asymptotic distribution of the parameter 
covariance matrix estimate, which will also play a role in the simulations. We will 
return to this issue later. Table 2.  Parameter estimates 











AG 1  2m, 
AGbr, 
AS3mt 












0.137  0.142  0.135  0.122  0.007 
1  .OO  0.26  0.46  0.79  0.64 
26.1  5.4  15.8  2.4  13.9 4  Simulation results 
4.1  Responses to monetary policy shocks 
We first calculated the dynamic response of the system to a monetary policy shock, 
ie an innovation in the tender rate. Intuitively, these impulse response functions 
provide the answer to the question: What happens if at a time when no rate change is 
anticipated, the Bank of Finland increases its tender rate by one percentage point and 
follows thereafter the monetary policy reaction function as estimated by the model? 
In this sentence, the words "when no rate change is anticipated" are quite important: 
a change in the tender rate is not tantamount to a monetary policy shock of the same 
size. The size of the shock represented by a rate change depends on whether it is 
anticipated or not. Although the equation estimated for the tender rate has the worst 
fit of the four interest rate equations, there are periods for which the expectation of 
a rate change has been clearly different from zero. For example, in week 43 of  1993, 
the tender rate was 7.14% while the 3-month market rate was 6.69%, indicating a 
strong expectation of  a downward  move  in  the tender rate.  According  to  the 
estimated equation, the expectation for the consequent week's tender rate was 6.96%. 
Hence, in that situation a rate reduction by 50 basis points would have constituted a 
negative shock of only 3 1 basis points while a similar move upwards would have 
been perceived as a 69 basis point positive shock. 
Figure 2 plots the impulse response functions of the five endogenous variables 
together with two standard error bounds. The standard errors are calculated from sets 
of  1000 draws using the standard Bayesian procedure. For each draw, a sample 
parameter covariance matrix  is  first drawn  from  a Wishart  distrib~tion.~  This 
covariance  matrix  then  defines  the  multi-normal  distribution  from  which  the 
coefficient vector is  drawn. Cointegrating vectors  are kept  constant across the 
~imulations.~ 
Because of the non-normality of the residuals (see the previous section), the parameter covariance 
matrix is not actually Wishart distributed, making the width of the confidence intervals likely to be 
slightly biased. In any case, the calculated standard errors are wider than what would be obtained 
using the classically oriented (rather than Bayesian) approach in which the parameter covariance 
matrix is treated as known. 
The simulated distribution of the impulse response functions seems to be well approximated by the 
normal distribution. We also allowed for the existence of skewness in the distribution by calculating 
the 2.5% and 97.5% fractiles from the empirical distribution of the draws. These proved to be very 
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Figure 2 indicates that the responses of  the short rates to a monetary policy 
shock are rather tightly estimated. By definition, the initial response of the tender rate 
to the shock is one percentage point. The response decays smoothly thereafter, so that 
within a year approximately half of the initial innovation has disappeared. In other 
words, the results indicate that a one percentage point increase in the tender rate 
today increases the expectation of the tender rate after a year by half a percentage 
point. 
The figure shows a similar pattern for the three month and the twelve-month 
money market rates. As expected, the response of  the three month rate is more 
pronounced with an 80-90  basis point initial response, half of which is still present 
a year later. For the twelve-month rate the increase is initially about 50 basis points 
and 30 basis points after a year. The relative sizes of the responses of the three short 
interest rates are roughly consistent with the expectation hypothesis: ie, the short run 
response of the 12-month rate is close to what could be expected on the basis of the 
response of the shorter rates over the course of the year. 
The reaction of the bond rate is markedly different from that of the shorter rates. 
The immediate response of the bond rate to the monetary policy shock is significantly 
different from zero: a 100-basis-point  positive shock to the tender rate increases the 
bond rate by roughly 20 basis points. This effect then disappears almost immediately. 
A week after the rate change, the remaining effect on the bond rate is not statistically 
significant, and after two months, the point estimate of the response drops to almost 
zero. It is worth noting that the lack of a systematic effect from the policy rate to the 
bond rate is not an artifact created by the choice of the cointegrating vectors (or more 
precisely, modelling the bond rate to cointegrate with the foreign rates): the impulse 
responses are, to all practical purposes, identical when the model is estimated in 
levels, ie when no restrictions are imposed on the cointegration space. We believe 
16 that this result is a consequence of various mechanisms offsetting each other. For 
example, the simple substitution effect between  short maturity  assets and long 
maturity assets indicates a positive effect from short rates to long rates. On the other 
hand, the "credibility effect" works in the opposite direction: a rate cut may increase 
the expectation of future inflation and future short rates, thus pushing long rates 
upwards. 
The model finds no statistically significant systematic effect from the policy rate 
to the exchange rate. Theoretical models would generally predict rate increases, 
ceteris paribus, to induce an appreciation of the currency. Findings of this type are 
not uncommon in empirical literature. For example, Sims (1992) and Grilli and 
Roubini (1993) found that positive interest rate innovations lead to a significant 
depreciation of the currency. Such a finding has actually been common enough that 
it has been dubbed "the exchange rate puzzle". Grilli and Roubini suggested that 
these results may be due to models excluding information to which the central bank 
actually responds. If  the exchange rate and the tender rate respond to common 
underlying causes, the resulting correlation may mask any true causality. In  the 
present context this argument has only limited power. If  the expectation hypothesis 
holds, then the shape of  the yield curve, which is included in the model, should 
capture all available information about the future evolution of the tender rate. Hence, 
the exclusion bias only arises if the common causes behind the tender rate and the 
exchange rate take place in a frequency shorter than a week.4 
We  offer these possible  explanations for the apparent lack  causality from 
monetary policy to exchange rate. First, it is simply likely that the majority of 
exchange rate movements stem from the real side of the economy and from situations 
in the international financial markets, and that the contribution of short interest rates 
is quite small. Extracting this small contribution from the data would require the 
inclusion of a more complete set of the major determinants. Second, although the 
markka is floating and the tender rate is not used actively to steer the exchange rate, 
it may be that the timing of  interest rate changes is chosen so as to support the 
stability of  exchange rate. Finally, the financial markets may not simply always 
follow mainstream theories. Sometimes a rate cut may be interpreted as a sign of 
confidence by the central bank, which can induce a currency appreciation. Sometimes 
the logic of the market may have been something like, "a  cut in the nominal rate 
induces a reduction in the real rate, which strengthens the economy so as to warrant 
an appreciation of the currency". The rationale behind such line of thinking may not 
be perfect, but there are certain recent episodes in which such reasoning seems to 
have been at work. 
Table  3  summarizes  the  forcast  error  decomposition  of  the  endogenous 
variables. The numbers reinforce the picture conveyed by  the impulse response 
functions. Shocks to the tender rate are an important source of variance at the short 
end of the yield curve but their contribution is negligible for the bond rate and the 
exchange rate. In the long-term, shocks to the tender rate account for about 85% of 
the variation in the 3-month rate but has virtually no contribution to the bond rate. 
In addition, the difference between the 3-month and the  1-month rates is not a perfect measure of the 
rate expectations for the next week. Table 3.  Forecast error decomposition 
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4.2  Permanent increase in the tender rate 
When there is discussion of  the effects of a change in the policy rate, impulse 
response functions such as what we calculated above are not what the typical policy 
maker has in mind. There is little interest in a temporary change in the policy rate that 
more or less quickly melts away as the system converges back to its equilibrium. 
Distinguishing questions in such cases can often be conceptually rather simple -  like; 
'What happens if the policy rate is cut by one percentage point and kept there for a 
while? Such innocent questions are notoriously difficult to analyze in a theoretically 
rigorous manner. In the context of the present model, there are at least three ways to 
approach this question, none of which is particularly appealing. Figure 3.  Permanent increase in the tender rate 
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The first, and the most straightforward, approach is to treat the tender rate as a 
random walk, exogenous to all other variables in the model. With such a strategy, the 
effects of any rate change could be measured by imposing the desired path for the 
tender rate and simulating with the remaining four equations. The unattractive part 
of this approach is that the exogeniety of the tender rate is rejected by the model: the 
slope of the short end of the yield curve does predict movements in the tender rate. 
A more Bayesian variant of this approach would be to use the joint distribution of the 
coefficients to calculate the expected values of  the coefficients of  the other four 
equations, conditional on all the parameters in the first equation being zero. In 
practice, the difference between these two approaches is very small. 
A second approach would be to calculate a time series of  monetary policy 
shocks which, when fed into the complete model, would first increase the tender rate 
by 100 basis points and thereafter keep it unchanged. In other words, the convergence 
of  the tender rate would be prevented by  continuously feeding in small positive 
monetary  policy  shocks. The downside of  this  approach is that it is internally 
inconsistent: it involves testing the effects of what essentially constitutes a particular 
change in the monetary policy reaction function, but at the same time maintaining 
model parameters which imply a very different reaction function. 
A third approach would be to impose more theoretical structure on the model 
and define the behavioral (invariant) equations governing the endogenous variables. 
One could then hypothesize a change in the "deep" parameters defining the Bank of 
Finland's reaction function. Unfortunately for this strategy, the theoretical virtues 
come at the price of insurmountable practical difficulties. 
The following results are calculated using the first approach. In effect, we shock 
the tender rate by 100 basis points and keep it unchanged from then on. The reactions 
of  the other endogenous variables are calculated from the system formed by the remaining four equations. The responses of the four variables with the approximate 
95% confidence intervals are plotted in Figure 3. 
Overall, the results correspond to the picture conveyed in the previous section. 
According to the model, the 3-month Helibor response to a 100 basis point increase 
in the tender rate reaches 90 basis points in about a month and stays close to that 
level thereafter. The response of the 1  Zmonth rate is slightly slower and converges 
to a little above 50 basis points. Again, neither the bond rate nor the exchange rate 
show a systematic response to changes in the tender rate. 
4.3  Changes in foreign rates 
In this section we examine the effects of changes in foreign interest rates on Finnish 
interest rates and the exchange rate. Since all foreign variables are exogenous in the 
model, some care must be taken to ensure the plausibility of  the scenarios. For 
example, it would make little sense to study the effect of  a one percentage point 
increase in the German bond rate while at the same time keeping the Swedish rate 
constant. A change in the financial market sentiment that induces a one percentage 
point increase in the German bond rate is bound to affect the Swedish rate. It is 
generally  observed  that  when  the  bond  markets  perceive  increased  general 
uncertainty, interest rates tend  to rise on bonds from non-core  members of  the 
European Union, relative to the core countries (eg Germany, France and Benelux). 
Conversely, when markets perceive a reduction in uncertainty, non-core countries 
tend to experience greater falls in interest rates than core nations. Specifically, we 
study the effects of the following two scenarios: 
1 
I  Figure 4.  Worldwide increase in bond rates 
i 
1  Tender rate  Three month rate  Twelve month rate 
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Exchange rate - Worldwide increase in bond rates. Financial markets revise their expectations 
about future monetary policies and long rates increase worldwide. We assume that 
the German bond rate increases (permanently) by  100 basis points and the 12-month 
rate by  50 basis points. Rate increases are more pronounced in fringe countries, so 
that the Swedish bond rate increases by  150 basis points and the 12-month rate by 75 
basis points. Short money market rates do not change. 
- Flight-to-quality. Uncertainty  about  the  international economy  and  financial 
markets increases, generating a flow of  capital from high-yield countries to safe 
havens. We assume that the Swedish bond rate increases by  100 basis points and the 
12-month rate by 50 basis points while the German rates remain unchanged. 
One may think the first scenario as something similar to what happened in the spring 
of  1994, when the rise in the US Federal Funds rate triggered a worldwide increase 
in  interest  rates.  In  the  USA  and  Germany,  bond  rates  increased  by  about  2 
percentage points, while the effect on countries such as Sweden, Italy, or Finland was 
close to 4 percentage points. The second scenario resembles the developments in 
early 1995, when bond rates came down rapidly in Germany and the USA, and stayed 
high or even increased in the high-yield countries. Figures 4 and 5 plot the responses 
of the Finnish rates to these episodes. Again, we calculate the 95 percent confidence 
intervals around our shock responses using a Monte Carlo simulation method with a 
random sample of  1000 draws. 
Figure 5.  Flight-to-quality 
Tender rate  Three month rate  Twelve month rate 
Bond rate  Exchange rate 
~  In the case of the worldwide increase in long rates, the yield curve reacts in a 
quite intuitive manner: bond rate reacts almost immediately by rising about 130 basis 
points and remaining at that level. Shorter rates response more slowly. The slowest to react is the tender rate, for which the response reaches 50 basis points in roughly 
a quarter of a year, and tops 100 basis points after about a year. Again, the adjustment 
in the shape of the yield curve is roughly consistent with the expectation hypothesis. 
In the long-run, all the responses converge to a level close to 130 basis points. As 
before, no systematic link is found between foreign interest rates and the exchange 
rate of the Finnish markka. 
The simulated responses to the flight-to-quality episode are qualitatively similar 
to those of the worldwide increase in bond rates. Finnish rates increase by 50 to 70 
basis points in the long-run. Again, the bond rate responds almost immediately, 
whereas the short rates adjust slowly as the Bank of Finland adjusts its tender rate. 
Interestingly, the exchange rate, which generally shows very little responsiveness in 
the  simulations  throughout  the  paper,  exhibits  here  a  statistically  significant 
response; a flight-to-quality episode seems to induce a small depreciation of  the 
markka. The calculated depreciation is about 1 percentage point and is significantly 
different from zero for approximately 3 months after the shock. 
4.4  what  is behind Finnish bond rate movements? 
The three years since the beginning of  1993 wittnessed several large and rapid swings 
in Finnish bond rates. In the beginning of  1993, the yield on the Finnish government 
10-year bond was about  11 %. During that year, bond rates came down rapidly, 
reaching a trough at around 6.5 %, rocketed back to 11 % in 1994, and have since 
slid downwards to approximately 7 %. In this section, we use our model to offer an 
idea of the driving forces behind these developments. We do this by decomposing 
changes in the bond rate during the estimation period into four sources: changes 
induced by shocks to monetary policy, changes induced by other (non-policy) shocks, 
effects of  foreign exogenous  variables  (foreign  interest rates  and the  Swedish 
exchange rate), and effects of  domestic exogenous variables (default risk and the 
credibility dummy).' 
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the contributions of the different sources. For each 
case, the left column plots the actual bond rate together with the simulated bond rate 
the model predicts would have been realized without the contribution of that element. 
The right column plots the difference between these two, ie the cumulative effect of 
the particular element since the beginning of the estimation period. 
Figure 6 plots the cumulative effects of monetary policy shocks (upper panels) 
and the cumulative aggregate effect of other, or "non-policy",  shocks (lower panels). 
For the monetary policy shocks, the results are in line with what can be expected on 
basis of the results reported above: the difference between the actual and simulated 
bond rates is almost indistinguishable. The contribution of monetary policy shocks 
on bond rates seldom exceeds 10 basis points. The effect of the non-policy shocks is 
somewhat larger, sometimes exceeding 30 basis points. Still, the overall contribution 
of shocks has been very modest. 
'  In addition to these four elements, the initial conditions cause minor changes in the level of the bond 
rate. Figure 6.  Contribution of exogenous variables on the bond rate 
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Figure  7  plots  the  effects  induced  by  changes  in  exogenous  variables. 
According to the simulations, changes in foreign interest rates (upper panels) seems 
to have been by far the single most important contributor to the changes in bond rates 
in recent years. The model attributes the fast drop in bond rates in  1993 and the 
subsequent increase in  1994 almost entirely to changes in the foreign variables. 
Also, approximately half of the 3 percentage point reduction in the bond rates during 
1995 seems to have been due to foreign effects. The other half  is attributed to 
improved domestic credibility (lower panels). Overall, the results indicate that the 
recent developments in Finnish bond rates have been dominated by factors other than 
changes in the Bank of Finland's tender rate. Figure 7.  Contribution of monetary policy and non-policy shocks on 
the bond rate 
%  Bond rate without monetary policy shocks  %  Effect of moneiary policy shocks 
11..  -  - 
%  Bond rate without non-policy shocks  %  Effect of non-policy shocks 
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4.5  Effects of the change of the operating procedure 
The  change  in  the  Bank  of  Finland  operating  procedure  in  December  1994 
constitutes a notable break in the time series properties of Finnish short rates, and it 
may have profound implications on the results of  this paper. In  this section we 
analyze the nature and magnitude of those effects. We divide our estimation period 
into two subperiods -  cut-off point  at  1994 week 48 -  and estimate the error- 
correction model separately for each. The cointegrating vectors remain the same for 
both subsamples. 
Although  the  degrees  of  freedom  still  remain  plentiful  after  splitting  the 
estimation period (57 in the smaller of  the subsample), this abundance is mostly 
illusory. Despite the high frequency of the data, most of the variation in the policy 
rate  takes  place  in  a  frequency  much  lower  than  a  week.  Hence,  subsample 
parameters are less tightly estimated than those of  the full sample, and confidence 
intervals around the point estimates are considerably wider. Figure 8.  Subsample responses to a monetary policy shock 
(1993: 1  1-1994:48  dashed line, 1994:49 -  1996:22 solid line) 
Tender rate  Three month rate  Twelve month rate 
Bond rate  Exchange rate 
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Figure 8 plots the impulse responses of the endogenous variables to a monetary 
policy shock for each of the subsamples. The dashed lines represent the responses 
estimated from the first subperiod and the solid line those estimated from the latter. 
Qualitatively, the impulse responses are quite similar across scenarios. Most notably, 
the persistence of  shocks to the tender rate is estimated to have been higher in the 
first subperiod. Before December 1994,75 percent of the shock is still estimated to 
be present after a year, while in the second subperiod, this percentage is close to 30. 
However, the confidence intervals are wide and the impulse response estimated from 
the whole sample fits well within the two standard error bounds for both subperiods. 
Conventional (asymptotic) tests for a structural break do not point to a significant 
change in the model  parameter^.^ 
The difference in the persistence of tender rate response shows up as a similar 
difference in the responses of other short rates. For both the 3-month rate and the 12- 
month rate, persistence of the response is estimated higher in the first subperiod. On 
the other hand, the response of the bond rate is markedly similar for both subperiods: 
a  slight positive reaction,  which  melts  away  almost  immediately. Further,  the 
response of exchange rate is estimated to be insignificantly different from zero for 
both subsamples. 
Likelihood ratio test produced the test value 124.7 and Lagrange multiplier test the value 109.8 for 
parameter stability. Both tests are asymptotically chi-squared distributed with 105 degrees of freedom. 
5% critical value for the tests is 129.9.  . Figure 9.  Subsample responses to a change in the tender rate 
(1993: 11-1994:48  dashed line, 1994:49 -  1996:22 
solid line) 
Three month rate  Twelve month rate 







In order to separate the effect of the change in the estimated persistence of the 
tender rate from any possible change in the causal relation from the tender rate to the 
other variables, we  also run  a simulation similar to that of  section 4.2 for both 
subperiods, ie we assume that the tender rate is increased by  100 basis points and 
kept at that level from then on. As can be seen in figure 9, the responses of  the 
remaining four endogenous variables are very similar for both periods. Short rates 
react in a manner much like what was estimated for the whole period. Bond rate and 
exchange rate do not seem to be affected by  the tender rate in either subperiod. 
Hence, the differences in the impulse responses to monetary policy shocks between 
the subperiods are almost entirely due to the estimated lower persistence of  the 
shocks for the latter period. 
We  conclude that the change in the Bank of  Finland operating procedure in 
December 1994 did not alter the transmission of  monetary policy in a significant 
way. 
5  Conclusions 
In this paper, we analyse the effects of Finnish monetary policy actions on money 
market rates, bond rates and the exchange rate, and study other determinants of 
Finnish yield curve. We construct a 5-variable error-correction system consisting of 
four interest rate variables and the exchange rate of the Finnish markka to analyse 
this problem. We follow a recent branch of work on the US data and define monetary 
policy shocks as innovations to the Bank of Finland 1-month tender rate. We find that the effects of monetary policy shocks are limited to the short end 
of the yield curve. According to the result, changes in Finnish bond rates closely 
follow circumstances in the international financial market and changes in the overall 
credibility of the Finnish economy, but do not seem to react systematically to changes 
in the Bank of Finland's tender rate. This behaviour is markedly different from, for 
example, what is observed in the US where the bond market seeks to anticipate the 
moves of  the Federal Open Market Committee and watches closely for signs of 
change in monetary policy trends. We interpret this as an indicator that the financial 
market perceives the future evolution of Finnish interest rates as largely dependant 
on international factors. 
Our other results generally support this interpretation. For example, we find that 
the signaling effect of monetary policy shocks is fairly short-lived: innovations to the 
policy rate have a half-life of  only about a year  and their effects on  short and 
medium-term money market rates have a similar persistence. With the obtained 
estimation precision, this means that changes in the policy rate only provide useful 
information of the future short rates over a horizon of around a year, With such short- 
lived effects on short rates, the impact of  a monetary policy shock on long rates 
cannot be expected to be large. 
We also analyse the causes of the large swings in bond rates in recent years. 
According  to  the  results,  monetary  policy  has  contributed  little  to  these 
developments. Instead, most  of  the  variation is  attributable to  changes  in  the 
international long rates and changes in the perceived credibility of  the Finnish 
government  . 
We fail to find a systematic effect from policy rates to the exchange rate of the 
Finnish markka. Although such a finding is not uncommon in other similar empirical 
studies, we do not want to emphasize this result too much. This result may be the 
outcome of our model failing to identify correctly the dependence of monetary policy 
actions on circumstances in the foreign exchange market. Although the markka is 
floating and the tender rate is not used actively to steer the exchange rate, it may be 
that the timing of interest rate changes is chosen so as to support the stability of the 
exchange rate. If this is the case, then a simultaneity bias affects the results. Also, 
during the estimation period, exchange rate variation was dominated by few major 
trends, the likely determinants of  which were outside the scope of the model. We 
suspect that longer time series and the inclusion of a more complete set of exchange 
rate determinants from the real side of the economy might help better to identify the 
effect of monetary policy on exchange rate. 
Finally, we want to reemphasize the point made in the introduction: throughout 
the analysis, the monetary policy regime has been taken as given. For example, the 
result that monetary policy shocks have not affected bond rates during the estimation 
period does not mean that monetary policy as a whole has not had an effect on bond 
rates. The monetary policy regime constitutes an integral part of  the mechanism 
through which the effects of exogenous variables are transmitted to endogenous 
variables. If  the monetary policy regime changed, this mechanism would most likely 
be affected. The results of this paper should be interpreted as relating to monetary 
policy actions which do not indicate a regime change -  in practice, to relatively small 
changes in the tender rate. References 
Armour, J., W.  Engert, and Fung, B. S. C. (1996) Overnight rate innovations as a measure of 
monetary policy shocks in vector autoregressions, Research Paper, Bank of Canada. 
Bemanke, B. S. (1986) Alternative explanations fo the money-income correlation, in K. Brunner 
and A. Meltzer, eds., Real Business Cycles, Real Exchange Rates and Actual Policies, Carnegie- 
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy no. 25, Amsterdam: North Holland, 1986. 
Bernanke, B. S., and Blinder, A. S. (1992) The Federal funds rate and the channels of monetary 
transmission, American Economic Review, 82,901-921. 
Bemanke, B. S., and Mihov, I. (1995) Measuring monetary policy, NBER Working Paper No. 4129. 
Cambridge: MIT Press 
Brunner,  A.  D.  (1994) The federal funds rate and the implimentation of  monetary policy: 
Estimating the Federal Reserve's reaction function, International Finance Discussion Papers, 
466, Board of Governers of the Federal Reserve system, May. 
Christiano,  L. J., and Eichenbaum, M. (1992) Liquidity effects, monetary policy, and the business 
cycle, NBER Working Paper No. 4129. Cambridge: MIT Press 
Cochrane, J. (1994) Shocks, NBER Working Paper No. 5154. Cambridge: MIT Press. working 
Cochrane, J. (1995) Identifying the output effects of monetary policy, NBER Working Paper No. 
5 154. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Dale, S., and Haldane, A. G. (1995) Interest rates and the channels of monetary transmission: 
Some sectoral estimates, European Economic Review, 29, 161  1-1626. 
Eichenbaum, M. (1992) Comments on 'Interpreting the time series facts: The effects of monetary 
policy' by Christopher Sims, European Economic Review, 36, 1001-101 1. 
I  Gali, J.  (1992) How well does the IS-LM model fit postwar US  data? Quarterly Journal  of 
Economics, May, 1992. 
!  Gerlach, S., and Smets, F.  (1995) The monetary policy transmission mechanism: Evidence from  I  the G7, Working Paper No. 26, Bank for International Settlements. 
Geweke, J. F., and Runkle, D. E. (1995) A fine time for monetary policy? Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis, Quarterly Review, Winter, 18-3 1. 
Grilli, V.  And Roubini, N. (1993) "Liquidity and Exchange rates: Puzzling Evidence from the G-7 
Countries," unpublished manuscript, Birbeck College and Yale University. 
I  Leeper E. M., and Gordon, D. B. (1992) In search of the liquidity effect, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 29,341-369. 
Leeper E. M., and Gordon, D. B. (1994) The dynamic impacts of monetary policy: An exercise in 
tentative identification, Journal of Political Economy, 102,6, 1228-1247. 
McCallum, B. T. (1983) A reconsideration of Sims' evidence concerning monetarism, Economic 
Letters, 13, 167-171. 
Mishkin, E S.  (1996) The channels of monetary policy transmission:  Lessons for monetary 
policy, NBER Working Paper No. 5464. Cambridge: MIT Press Reichenstein, W.  (1987) The impact of money on short-term interest rates, Economic Inquiry, 25, 
1,67-82. 
Sims, C. (1992) Interpreting the macroeconomic time series facts: The effects of monetary 
policy, European Economic Review, 36,975-101 1. 
Strongin, S. (1995) The identification of monetary policy disturbances: Explaining the liquidity 
puzzle, Journal of Monetary Economics, 35,463497. BANK OF FINLAND DISCUSSION PAPERS 
-  - 
ISSN 0785-3572 
1/96  Kari T. Sipila A Data Communication Network for Administrative Purposes within the 
EU.  1996.53 p. ISBN 951-686-492-9. (TK) 
2/96  Veikko Saarinen -  Kirsti Tanila -  Kimrno Virolainen  Payment and Settlement Systems 
in Finland 1995. 1996. 60 p. ISBN 951-686-493-7. (RM) 
3/96  Harri Kuussaari  Systemic Risk in the Finnish Payment System: an Empirical 
Investigation. 1996. 32 p. ISBN 951-686-494-5. (RM) 
4/96  Janne Lauha  OTC-johdannaiset  ja Suomen oikeus (OTC Derivatives and Finnish Law 
r 
r  1996. 98 p. ISBN 95 1-686-495-3.  (RATA) 
Jukka Ahonen -  Ilmo Pyyhtia  Suomen teollisuuden rakenne ja hairioalttius suhteessa 
muihin EU-maihin (The structure of Finnish industry and its sensitivity to shocks in 
comparison to other EU countries). 1996. 37 p. ISBN 95 1-686-496-  1. (RP) 
Pekka Ilmakunnas -  Jukka Topi  Microeconomic and Macroeconomic Influences on 
Entry and Exit of Firms. 1996.33 p. ISBN 951-686-497-X. (TU) 
Jaakko Autio Korot Suomessa 1862-1952  (Interest Rates in Finland). 1996.55 p. 
ISBN 95 1-686-498-8. (TU) 
Vesa Vihriala Theoretical Aspects to the Finnish Credit Cycle. 1996.63 p. 
ISBN 95 1-686-500-3. (TU) 
Vesa Vihriala Bank Capital, Capital Regulation and Lending. 1996.52 p. 
ISBN 951-686-501-1. (TU) 
Vesa Vihriala Credit Growth and Moral Hazard. An Empirical Study of the Causes of 
Credit Expansion by the Finnish Local Banks in 1986-1990.  1996. 53 p. 
ISBN 95 1-686-502-X. (TU) 
Vesa Vihriala Credit Crunch or Collateral Squeeze? An Empirical Analysis of Credit 
Supply of the Finnish Local Banks in 1990-1992. 1996.50 p. ISBN 951-686-503-8. 
(TU) 
Peter Redward Structural Reform in New Zealand: A Review. 1996. 35 p. 
ISBN 95 1-686-504-6. (KT) 
13/96  Kaare Guttorm Andersen -  Karlo Kauko A Cross-country Study of  Market-Based 
Housing Finance. 1996.45 p. ISBN 951-686-505-4. (RM) 
14/96  Kristina Rantalainen Valtion luotonotto ja velkapaperimarkkinat Italiassa (Government 
borrowing and the debt instrument markets in Italy). 1996. 29 p. ISBN 951-686-506-2. 
(RM) 
15/96  Tuomas Saarenheimo Monetary Policy for Smoothing Real Fluctuations? -  Assessing 
Finnish Monetary Autonomy. 1996. 36 p. ISBN 951-686-508-9. (KT) 
16/96  Mikko Ayub  Elakerahoitus ja talouskasvu. Taloutta kohtaavien sokkien vaikutus 
kasvuun ja hyvinvointiin osittain rahastoivassa elakejarjestelm%sa (Pension Financing 
and Economic Growth. The Effect of Exogenous Shocks on Economic Growth and Utility 
in a Partly Funded Pension System). 1996.72 p. ISBN 951-686-509-7. (TU) 17/96  Veikko Saarinen Maksujarjestelmat ja -valineet Suomessa (Payment Systems and 
Payment Instruments in Finland).  1996. 34 p. ISBN 951-686-511-9. (RM) 
18/96  Antti Ripatti Stability of the Demand for M1 and Harmonized M3 in Finland. 1996. 
31 p. ISBN 951-686-513-5. (TU) 
19/96  Juha Seppala -  Petri Viertio The Structure of Interest Rates: Estimation and 
Interpretation. 1996.55 p. ISBN 95 1-686-5  14-3. (MO) 
20196  Jukka Ahonen Suomen Pankki ja tiedotusvalineet -  virkamiesten ja taloustoimittajien 
vuorovaikutus (The Bank of Finland and the Media -  Interaction between Officials and 
Financial Journalists). 1996.5  1 p. ISBN 95 1-686-5  15-1. (TIE) 
21/96  Matti Ahokas -  Harri Kuussaari -  Kimmo Virolainen Johdannaismarkkinat. 
Maailmanlaajuinen keskuspankkikysely (The Derivative Markets: A Worldwide Central 
Bank Survey). 1996.43 p. ISBN 951-686-516-X. (RM) 
22/96  Peter Redward -  Tuomas Saarenheimo From Policy Rate to Market Rates: An Empirical 
Analysis of Finnish Monetary Ikansmission. 1996. 29 p. ISBN 95 1-686-5  18-6. (KT) 